Founding Moral Reasoning on Evolutionary Psychology: A Critique and an Alternative

2003

Saras Sarasvathy

In this paper I develop a critique of the strong adaptationist view inherent in the work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, as presented at the Ruffin Lectures series in 2002. My critique proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, I advance arguments as to why I find the particular adaptation story that the authors advance for their experimental results unpersuasive even when I fully accept the value of their experimental results. In the second stage, I grant them their adaptation story and critique the implications of such stories for business ethics and for future research. In sum, I argue against recasting key problems in the social sciences to fit the use of tools developed in the so-called “hard” sciences. Instead, I urge that we deal with these problems on their own terms, i.e. through their basis in and dependence on deliberate social action.

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